Disarmament - Transarmament and Non Military Defence.

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ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS AND DISARMAMENT

1. There is no single road to a disarmed world. Militarism and armaments have to be attacked from a variety of angles.

2. Disarmament strategies presuppose some understanding of the forces and processes underlying militarism and arms build-up. To some extent these forces may vary from one country to another. The present militarization of Third World countries is a process different from the militarization of the superpowers and other great powers. In Europe, there may be not insignificant differences between e.g. Norway, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and Poland. However, simplifying reality and focusing on the superpowers and their allies, certain important patterns may be outlined.

3. The militarization of the allies of the US and the USSR is to a large extent a reflection of the armaments race between the two superpowers. Earlier the mounting armaments were explained in terms of action-reaction processes. On the background of the international conflict formations and an atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and secrecy, every upward step by one side was seen to produce reaction and overreaction by the other. Armaments were explained in terms of external forces.

Today this widespread theory seems to offer only part of an elucidation. Greater awareness has been drawn to the military-industrial-scientific-bureaucratic complex, and perhaps particularly to the role of military research and development (R&D) in an arms race which is of an increasingly qualitative rather than a quantitative nature. The role of internal forces has been fairly widely treated in peace research literature and has recently been emphasized in the 1977 UN report on Economic and Social consequences of the Armaments race, which says:

"Under conditions of rapid military innovation (...) the decisive factor in the military procurement plans of countries at the forefront of the technological arms race is not so much the actual military strength of their opponents, but rather those technological advances which opponents might be able to achieve over the next decade or so (10 years being the typical gestation period for a major technological advance). Inevitably, as the apprehensions of military planners shift from the force levels towards the R and D efforts of their opponents, it is increasingly on the R and D efforts of their own country, which are known, that they will have to base their plans. In an arms race where the stress is on technological advances, the process of weapon and counter-weapon development therefore tends to become in some measure an intra-national process, in some cases only marginally related to the stages actually reached by other countries. Each country is actively seeking means of defeating its own most advanced weapons and of neutralizing its own most recent defences, thus conferring to the development of military technology a momentum and a rate of obsolescence much greater than in comparable civilian applications." (1)

Armaments dynamics, then, is nowadays rooted much more in internal than in external forces. The driving forces behind armaments are to a large extent of a selfsustained autistic nature. This inner logic of the arms race ("die Eigendynamik") also explains why the race continues unabated in spite of detente. On no account, of course, should the level of armaments be taken automatically to correspond to the intensity of latent or underlying conflict. Military capability is not identical with actual intended military threat. (2)

DISARMAMENT STRATEGIES - TWO APPROACHES

4. To some extent these two theories of armaments dynamics, which may supplement each other, have as counterparts two different disarmament approaches.

The inter-system explanation, which views armaments as rooted in an action-reaction process, corresponds (more or less) to a set of inter-system disarmament strategies, characterized by negotiations and agreements at the diplomatic level.

The intra-system explanation, which emphasizes the selfsustained autistic nature of the armaments race ("die Eigendynamik"), points to a variety of intra-system strategies, characterized by internal disarmament and demilitarization measures, often carried out by (or involving) the non-elites and the grass roots, and often directed against elites. (3)

5. Inter-system strategies are typified by e.g. the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), the SALT negotiations, various control or verification measures accompanying arms control agreements, NGO conferences, "soning" (i.e. stata-
blushing geographical zones of a special status with regard to military forces ans weapons, e.g. a ceiling on military personnel or warheads, or non-stationing of military bases or nuclear weapons.

Some of these efforts are important (e.g. efforts to arrive at a complete nuclear test ban, CBT). Many of them have tended to divert attention from the real problems (e.g. because of long lead-times for the development of new weapon systems, the new technology introduced outstrips the pace of arms control negotiations; and so far limiting the military R and D, which is of crucial importance to a cessation of the arms race, has not been the subject of serious international negotiations). Most arms control agreements have been without any real significance. Some agreements or negotiations have even had a spurring effect on the armaments race or proved an obstacle to disarmament. (SALT I, which set a ceiling on intercontinental missiles, became an incentive to technological emulation and innovation; MBFR may have been an impediment to unilateral force reductions).

Although many of the inter-system strategies up till now have tended to perpetuate armaments (and the overall approach may easily function as "ideology", i.e. sustain the status quo through a misconception or distortion of reality), some measures may be important to radical war resisters and antimilitarists. Attacking the military R and D, pressing for a complete test ban, restrictions on arms trade would be a few examples. Further, NGO conferences, UN reports, etc, may be utilized to promote and legitimize radical disarmament ideas. Alternative disarmament strategies may also be legitimized by the very failure of many of the existing inter-system measures to achieve significant results. (4)

INTRA-SYSTEM DISARMAMENT STRATEGIES

6. Intra-system strategies have always represented to radical war resisters and antimilitarists the most trustworthy, though not only approach. The following is a brief outline of some prototypes, not an inventory or a detailed scenario.

(a) The modern war system relies heavily on advanced technology, brought forth by an increasingly qualitative arms race. Intra-system strategies attacking the "hardware" of the war system - the technology - may be aimed at researchers and workers, who develop and produce this technology.

Researchers may be channelled away from military R and D through e.g. Hippocratic oaths, through compulsory seminars (not lectures!) on ethics and science and on the social responsibility of scientists as an integral and central part of university training, through budgetary reductions on military research, through certain privileges in civilian research, and through various kinds of "ostacism" and "stigmatization" - e.g. exclusion from research associations and conferences, student boycotts at universities, provisions that awards (e.g. the Nobel Prize) and scholarships/grants can only be given to researchers who have never (or not for the last 15 or 20 years) been engaged in military R and D. Con-

version of existing R and D potentials to constructive use in national and international development tasks will be of crucial importance.

Among workers in military industry (as among researchers) consciousness raising is needed. Influencing trade unions will be particularly important. Military production may thus be countered by strikes and by boycotts of military plants or of jobs in predominantly civilian factories linked to the development or production of war technology. A serious challenge is the creation of alternative jobs and peace conversion of industry.

(b) Strategies attacking the "software" of the war system - the personnel - may e.g. be systematic discrediting of the profession of military officers. In the modern war machine military officers, bureaucrats and researchers might be regarded more or less in the same way as lepers in former societies.

Promoting conscientious objection among conscripts on pacifist or non-pacifist, antimilitarist principles - may be an effective antimilitarist strategy. The significance of individual CO, however, does not reside in the reduction of the manpower of the war system. The loss of manpower represented by a large CO group may be fairly easily tackled by the military by employing more professional personnel (although this may prove more expensive), or through rationalization and automation (i.e. heavier reliance on technology). The political significance of CO lies in its effect on public opinion, and in the education of the CO's themselves. A large CO group in a country (as e.g. in Norway, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany) is a very noticeable and visible opposition to the military system (more so than the opposition of soldiers working from the inside). Through their very existence and through their demands for a peace promoting alternative service, the CO group attracts attention to alternative peace and defence policies, and may be regarded as the materialization of ideas pointing beyond the present deterrent and war system. At the same time the alternative service should be a period when CO's undergo an educational process ("Bildungsprozess"), developing through contact with other CO's a stronger commitment and a better understanding of antimilitarism, nonviolence and peace politics.

Conscripts not sharing the convictions of CO's may be encouraged to spread antimilitarist views and to start study and discussion groups inside the forces. To some extent this strategy is complementary to conscientious objection.

(c) Attention should be focused on the military budgets. It would be a sound disarmament strategy to demand a reduction of military budgets by 5-10 per cent per annum, and transference of the funds to human development purposes, such as day care centres, aid to underprivileged groups, specific medical research projects in Third World countries. The UN have declared the 1970s to be both a disarmament and development decade. Forging closer links between disarmament and development efforts should be an essential part of a comprehensive disarmament programme.
In countries with a military R and D potential, and most industrialized countries will have some potential, particular attention should be paid to these budgetary items (which may very well be found anywhere else than in the Defence budget).

One should also be aware that European research institutions are used by the US for military R and D purposes, thus joining them to the forefront of the arms race.

Any military budget should be accompanied by a civilian "peace conversion" budget, showing how the funds allocated to the military could be used for civilian purposes. We should demand that this become an institutionalized practice. However, since the authorities will be reluctant to undertake this job, peace research institutions or peace activists should be prepared to provide the alternative budgets.

Similarly one might demand that any military plant predominantly civilian plant undertaking military projects as a principle elaborate plans for transition to purely civilian production.

(d) Less secrecy and more public debate about the military, defence policies and disarmament strategies should be encouraged. In many countries (and probably more so in both USSR and Western Europe than in the US) there is an exaggerated and unjustified degree of secrecy and classifying of information. As a consequence public debate is impeded and public opinion pacified. Public debate about important and controversial questions is a necessary prerequisite of any democracy. In many cases information (e.g. about military establishments or installations) is kept classified or secret because of foreign powers (who already possess this information through intelligence systems and "services") but because of the domestic population and public opinion (who want a missile war target in the neighbourhood?)

Given the counterforce strategy of the superpowers, where the targets are the military establishments and installations of the opponent (e.g. missile silos and navigation and communication systems, the latter depending on installations/stations in many parts of the world), it should be a human right to know whether one is living in a "high risk area" or not. In a country like Norway, for instance, maps of high risk areas are classified information. We should demand that they be not. (A general knowledge of military strategies, some knowledge of military technology and the domestic "military geography" make it possible for anybody to draw at least fragmentary maps of these areas).

In certain circumstances the publication in one's own society of military secrets or other classified information revealing the nature of the war system may be legitimate. Dan Ellsberg has set an example for other officials in defence ministries and similar institutions.

All strategies mentioned above will have as an important effect the stirring up of public debate. Nonviolent direct action against military institutions and armaments industry may be a particularly effective technique of focusing attention on important issues.

(e) The overall strategy must be a strategy of transition from present war systems to future peace constructive systems. This involves a rather fundamental change of political, economic, social and psychological structures - a nonviolent revolution. Military-industrial-scientific-bureaucratic complexes would have to be eliminated, so would ideologies and attitudes sustaining armaments and militarism. "Peacefare" nations would probably be nations of small, egalitarian and "self-reliant" communities. Relations to other nations (or whatever will then be the name of larger political units) would be characterized by equitable, non-exploitative, co-operative interaction patterns.

(f) The present armament process is detrimental to international security. Disarmament is a sound security policy. But also disarming nations will need defences. Even a disarmed world - perhaps located somewhere in a distant future - will have disrupting conflicts between groups and nations. A world without conflicts is neither possible, nor certainly desirable.

Disarmament strategies, then, must include alternative defence policies, capable at the same time of defending basic values and of liberating nations from the international militarism and the global armaments race. Some socialist antimilitarists will suggest a guerrilla defence, transferring rather uncritically the experiences of guerrilla liberation forces in Third World countries to the situation of industrialized countries.

Radical war resisters and antimilitarists should put particular emphasis on non-military defence (NMD). An outline of NMD, or nonviolent, civilian-based defence, is given in the next section.

No country is probably going to abandon military defence without confidence in a substitute defence policy. The disarmament strategies mentioned above should therefore more properly be regarded as part of a more comprehensive trans-armament strategy, a gradual change-over from armaments and military defence to a non-military, civilian-based defence.

NON-MILITARY DEFENCE

7. In various circles today we witness a growing recognition of the role that civilian resistance may play in conflict situations. Often in history aggressors have been met with non-military resistance - sometimes alongside military combat, sometimes instead of armed struggle. Even if this improvised and unprepared civilian-based resistance in a number of situations has achieved considerable results (and sometimes been more effective than military combat), it is evident that it would have been more effective if it had been systematically prepared in peace time. The historical experience that civilian resistance will arise under occupation should in itself be sufficient reason for both the authorities and the grass roots here and now to start making preparations for non-military defence, so that this kind of resistance in case of aggression (or coup d'état) can gain maximum strength.
In some countries the authorities have already taken an interest in civilian-based defence and the potential role of civilian resistance in a defence policy. Civilian resistance ideas seem particularly to have struck root in smaller countries. We have e.g. witnessed not insignificant debates in the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria as well as in the Federal Republic of Germany. Studies have been initiated by the Danish, Swedish and Dutch authorities (8).

8. The theory of NMD is partly based on fairly extensive historical experience, partly on more general insights from the social sciences. Relevant historical experience comprise cases of unarmed resistance against occupations (e.g. against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; resistance in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, etc., during World War II; Czechoslovakia 1948; the "chignon women" in Vietnam during the latter part of the Indochina war), resistance against coups d'etat (e.g. against Kornilow's attempted coup in Russia in 1917; the Kapp Putsch in 1920; the generals' revolt in Algeria in 1961), and resistance against dictatorships and colonial regimes (e.g. Gandhi's satyagraha movement in India; resistance against President Ibáñez in Chile in 1933; against President Martinez in El Salvador in 1944; against President Ubico in Guatemala in 1944; the Buddhist struggle against President Diem in South Vietnam in 1963). (9)

Civilian resistance is deeply rooted in history, even if historians as well as ordinary people have had better eyes for violent forms of struggle than for nonviolent, civilian resistance. In this respect there is to some extent a need for a redefinition of history. As we gain a better understanding of the role played in history by non-military means of struggle, we will also come to regard history in a different light. As our view of history changes, the future - our future possibilities - will assume different contours. (10)

9. NMD is based on a conception of power different from and more fundamental and sophisticated than the traditional, military view. Military action is based largely on the idea that the most effective way of defeating the opponent is by inflicting heavy destruction on his armies, military equipment, transport system, factories and perhaps cities. Nonviolent, civilian defence is based on a different approach: to deny the opponent the assistance and cooperation which are necessary if he is to exercise control over the population or social system. (11)

A ruler's power is ultimately dependent on obedience, support and cooperation from the people he would rule. The master is dependent on the slave for his position as master (12).

10. In strategies aimed at the opponent NMD tries to exploit this dependency through non-cooperation with the aggressor seeking to gain control over the social system. Non-cooperation tactics may take different forms, and include e.g. strikes, economic, social and political boycotts, work-to-rule, go-slow actions, "Swjek-methods" and obstruction. Another group of tactics may be classified as intervening actions, e.g. sabotage against one's own property (production and communication facilities of special importance to the invader), an advanced form of the scorched earth tactic. Effective communication with occupying soldiers as persons, combined with non-cooperation with their military roles, may be part of the strategy directed against the opponent. In other situations total social boycott may be more effective as a means of demoralizing the forces.

11. Strategies aimed at protecting oneself include maintenance of effective communication within the population of the occupied society. Uncertainty about the actual situation and the existing guidelines or directives of resistance leads to confusion, chaos, apathy, and makes the population vulnerable to psychological warfare. Emergency plans for central and local institutions and for food supplies, etc., are important measures for protecting one's own group.

12. Strategies aimed at third parties are e.g. contact with third parties and with sympathizing groups in the invader's country which may promote internal and external pressure on the rulers of the occupying nation. (In many colonial wars some of the decisive "battles" have been fought by sympathizers in the colonial countries: cf. also the significance of the anti-war movement in the US during the Indo-China war).

13. Civilian resistance will be met with counter-strategies. These - which to some extent are subjects of open or classified military research today - may be the use of collaborators in central positions, psychological warfare, blockade of vital goods or services, terror and brutal military repression. Experience (e.g. from Norway and other countries during World War II) indicates that it is considerably more difficult to undertake severe military repression if the civilian resistance is perceived as absolutely unarmed and nonviolent, than in cases where it is combined with or linked to military resistance, e.g. guerrilla warfare. Violence by, or in support of the civilian resisters, may sharply counter the operation of the mechanisms of change on which nonviolent resistance is based. Experience also shows that brutal military repression by the invader may (but not by necessity) undermine his own position - through world opinion and third parties, demoralization of his forces, consolidation of the occupied people, and through resistance from opposition groups in his own country (13).

14. The preventive or dissuasive effect of NMD (NMD as "deterrent") will be proportional to the resistance that may be expected by a potential invader. The not uncommon claim (e.g. from military circles) that NMD presumes occupation - that NMD can only have effect when an occupation is a fact - ignores the dissuasive function of NMD.

15. NMD involves preparations in peace time: emergency plans, information and directives, training of the population and man-agers (e.g. in various institutions, in factories, in communities). Certain occupational groups would need special training. Technical preparations would also be necessary. Some of these preparations would resemble the civil emergency planning of the total defence today, but would have a more decentralized character.
16. There is a certain correlation between social structure and defence policy. Different types of defence may presuppose different societal bases. The stronger cohesion and the lesser class conflicts in a group, the stronger and more effective the resistance. A society characterized by decentralization of power and initiative and by a large degree of self-reliance will favour civilian resistance. Societies of this kind will be far less vulnerable in emergency situations and crises than societies having a steep "pyramid structure", where power and initiative are centralized and concentrated at the top.

If the top of the pyramid or the central axes of the machinery are removed, the rest of the system is easily paralyzed. A social structure particularly favouring NMD coincides with the goals of a non-violent social revolution.

17. NMD may be regarded as a complete alternative or as part of a defence policy including both non-military and military measures. To what extent and in what way civilian and military forms of resistance may be coordinated is a somewhat controversial question. The dynamics of non-military struggle, is different from that of military struggle, and the two forms of resistance may easily counteract each other. If civilian resistance is identified with or perceived as an indirect part of an overall military strategy, it will normally be easier for an invader to undertake severe repression of the non-violent resistance. It seems that military and civilian resistance - if coordinated - have to be separated in space and time and with regard to organization - e.g. military resistance during the invasion, civilian resistance when the invader tries to gain control over the social system; or military resistance in certain districts (sparsely populated areas), civilian resistance in other areas (cities and other densely populated areas).

The question of a mixed defence is raised here, not because such a defence should be regarded as more effective than a purely non-military civilian-based defence. The question is raised because it seems unlikely that nations will adopt a purely civilian defence overnight. For a significant period, civilian defence preparations will have to be carried out alongside military defence measures, until the latter may be phased out since they will no longer be regarded as necessary (14).

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON TRANSARMAMENT

18. In NMD literature one finds two principal views of the relation between transarmament and social structure. Some proponents of NMD regard the transarmament process as a rather limited and well-defined social reform. Others see the process of transarmament as presupposing, or parallel to a social revolution. Some focus on the political parties and others on political elites as the chief agents of change. Others place heavier emphasis on the grass roots and the working class. (15)

By the present author transarmament is viewed as a gradual process of system-transcending reforms. (16) The question of the agents of change should not be regarded as an a priori either-or (elites vs. grass roots), but probably as an empirical both-and (grass roots as well as political parties and political elites), the emphasis being dependent on the situation.

The basic prerequisite of any significant social change is more or less massive consciousness formation. As we raise an opinion against the mounting armaments, we must also raise an opinion for a civilian-based, non-military defence. As stated above, an intermediate step in this transarmament process will probably be a mixed defence, which in many countries today can be potentially supported by a fairly large number of radical and liberal groups.

The strategy of transarmament will have to concentrate on intra-system disarmament measures, but not to the complete exclusion of inter-system strategies. The intra-system approach should also, of course, be viewed in a transnational perspective. (17)

Disarmament, transarmament and non-military defence should then to conclude, be three basic corner-stones - or rather three Chinese boxes - in pacifist and antimilitarist work in the future.

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1. UN Doc. A/32/98 of 12 August 1977, Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its extremely harm-
ful effects on World Peace and Security, p. 21.


3. Although he may find certain ideas distorted, I am here and in the following partly and happily indebted to a lecture by Johan Galtung at the University of Oslo, autumn 1972.

4. For a discussion of the functions of SALT, see Sverre Lodgaard, "The Functions of SALT", Journal of Peace Research n° 1/1977 (edited at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, published by Universitetsforlaget, P.O. Box 7508, Skillebekk, Oslo 2, or P.O. Box 142, Boston, Mass. 02113, USA).

5. Several reports, which have been used as background materials for the Swedish Ministry some years ago engaged Adam Roberts (ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National Defence (note 7), Ebert et al, Demokratische Sicherheitspolitik (note 7).

6. For a critique of this trend, see Theodor Ebert, Gewaltfreier Aufstand - Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer Bucherei 1123, 1970, pp. 12-17.

7. The basics of NMD (civilian-based defence) and transarma-

8. See Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, Krigsvold som nation-
allyverv, Viborg : Spektro-display, 1971, (English edition: War Without War - Non-violent Self-defence, Schocken Books Inc., NY, 1975, German edition: Krieg ohne Waffen, Reinbek : Rowohlt 1974). This study was made for the Danish working group on disarmament questions, under the leadership of Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Defence Ministry some years ago engaged Adam Roberts (London School of Economics) to investigate the po-
Petersen, Stockholm : The Research Institute of Swedish National Defence, 1972), and Adam Roberts, Civilomstændende teknik, Stockholm 1976. The main findings of Roberts are rather punctually referred to in the Defence Paper of 1976 : SOU 1976:9, Sährerstrategi och totalförsvare, Stockholm 1976, but the paper states that civilian resistance may be an important con-
tribution to the total defence planning (pp. 57-59, pp. 208-209). Further studies are recommended by the report. In march 1977 the Dutch authorities (the Ministry of Science & Education) launched a wide-scope study of civilian based defence and nonviolent conflict resolution. International con-
sultants are four of the most outstanding researchers in this field - Theodor Ebert (Freie Universität Berlin), Johan Galtung (Interpeace International Project, Geneva), Adam Roberts (London School of Economics) and Gene Sharp (Harvard University).


10. The last statement is not intended to imply an "historical empiricism" - that the future is more or less a replica of the past. The future, on the contrary, is always potential trans-
scendence of the past - transcendence of past and existing structures and possibilities.


12. Cf. Hegel's discussion of this relationship. This dis-
cussion has been further developed by Marx ans Sartre. It is also found in Gandhi.


14. For discussions of the dynamics of civilian resistance and the question of combining military and non-military forms of struggle, see e.g., Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (note 9), and "The Technique of Nonviolent Action", in Roberts, Civilian Resistance as a National Defence, and Gene Sharp, "National Defence without Armaments", in Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives (note 7). See also Johan Galtung, "The Strategy of non-military defence", in Galtung, Peace, War and Defence, Copenhagen : Christian Elers Forlag 1976. The view that civilian resistance should be kept separate from military resistance in space, time and with regard to organization is one of Roberts' conclu-
sions in his studies for the Swedish Defence Ministry (note 8).

15. See e.g., Roberts (ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National Defence (note 7), Ebert et al, Demokratische Sicherheitspoli-
tik (note 7), Boserup and Mack (note 8). See also Adam Roberts, "Defence and Nonviolent Conflict Resolution", statement by a Research Project, Geneva, Adam Roberts (London School of Economics) and Gene Sharp (Harvard University).


17. Cf. e.g., George Lakey, Manifesto for Nonviolent Revolu-

18. See Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, Krigsvold som nation-
allyverv, Viborg : Spektro-display, 1971, (English edition: War Without War - Non-violent Self-defence, Schocken Books Inc., NY, 1975, German edition: Krieg ohne Waffen, Reinbek : Rowohlt 1974). This study was made for the Danish working group on disarmament questions, under the leadership of Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Defence Ministry some years ago engaged Adam Roberts (London School of Economics) to investigate the possibilities of civilian resistance in Swedish defence planning. Two reports, which have been used as background materials for the Swedish Defence Paper of 1976, have been published : Adam Roberts, Totalförsvare och civilomstændende, Stockholm ; Försvarsteaterns Forskningsanstalt 1972 (English version : Total Defence and Civilian Resistance, Problems of Sweden's Security Policy, Stockholm : The Research Institute of Swedish National Defence, 1972), and Adam Roberts, Civilomstændende teknik, Stockholm 1976. The main findings of Roberts are rather punctually referred to in the Defence Paper of 1976 : SOU 1976:9, Sährerstrategi och totalförsvare, Stockholm 1976, but the paper states that civilian resistance may be an important contribution to the total defence planning (pp. 57-59, pp. 208-209). Further studies are recommended by the report. In march 1977 the Dutch authorities (the Ministry of Science &

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